We must be prepared to face the storm. The acute challenges facing European security have not been as great since the height of the ‘second phase’ of the cold war in early eighties, whilst the institutional architecture of defence has either failed to adapt or is fundamentally inadaptable to today’s challenges.
The combination of an unwillingness in most European states to take defence spending seriously, increasing ideological differences with the United States and the pressing issue of its reliability as a friend and ally, the unfeasibility of taking European integration further given political opposition and institutional unwieldiness for the time being in an era of renewed danger is leaving EU citizens at risk and its elites directionless and unsure where to turn.
The immediate security challenges for the EU member states are both radically different and ominously familiar. The rise of a violent mass ideology of Islamic extremism in the near-abroad, with increasing in-roads at home in dissatisfied immigrant Muslim communities, has seen a serious threat of terrorism emerge within the Union. The same force is threatening to transform the political topography of North Africa and the Middle East from a series of cruel and unpopular regimes with friendly relations to Europe, into a sequence of bloody revolutions repeating Khomeini’s ’79 - with potentially catastrophic consequences for the continent. The resurgence of Russia now ruled by an FSB elite, buoyed by the strategic resources of oil and natural gas which have been increasingly used to further the restoration of an exclusive sphere of interest and roll back democratisation is now emerging as a major challenge. In terms of power-projection, Russia may now have more of capacity to influence and actually control western-European governments than at any time since the opening salvoes of the Cold War. Environmental concerns may present massive security challenges very shortly, of which recent mass flooding, forest fires and heat-waves could be mere overtures.
All of these Europe specific challenges are occurring during a dangerous phase of transition from American uni-polarity, which has been incredibly poorly managed by the Bush Administration, towards an age when economically, technologically and demographically multi-polarity is becoming a reality and no longer an abstract inevitability. The United Sates, poised on an edge between aggressive Jacksonian militarism and populist introversion, is fast becoming an un-reliable ally and as recent events in the Middle East suggest - even a liability to the EU. Neither Democratic protectionism and introversion or militaristic ideological Republicanism are consistent with European aims and ideals, both are harmful and will undermine our position if we continue to rely upon Washington. Looking at Asia’s rising powers, China is clearly not a ‘strategic partner’ as its enthusiasm for the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation has shown, and with India, despite the optimism, it is simply too early to say. The delicate and overlapping legal, financial and security realms of American uni-polarity are decomposing and face collapse if the mounting Iranian crisis leads to war. Europe cannot shelter from this storm, hope to ignore or not be affected by it. The challenge is real and the moment is now.
European security has been based around four axiomatic beliefs since 1991. The first is a conviction that American influence is broadly positive and that the US imperium is ‘shared’ with the EU and is furthering Europe’s own ends. Since 2001, needless to say American foreign policy has not been helpful. The second premise is that the democratisation experience in Eastern Europe could be repeated world-wide to encourage EU security, denying any counter-vailing opinions and evidence that suggest it was a historical ‘one-off’ based more on the re-integration of countries that had been militarily and culturally occupied by Soviet Russia. The third conviction was that NATO could evolve into a force to spread democratisation, eventually spread to include most former Soviet states and even the Russian Federation, and conduct ‘out of theatre’ operations in the near-abroad. Despite the extreme difficulty of responding even to the Balkan wars, considering it took genocide and an attempted mass-expulsion to get NATO on the ground and the extreme difficulties of operating in Afghanistan as an alliance commanders and journalists are reporting daily, for some reason this belief had remained axiomatic orthodoxy in the debate. Finally, European policy makers and debate formers have remained convinced that the options on the table are an either/or solution between a ‘European army’ and continuing NATO. The European alternative is none-viable for the short to medium terms as it is part of a vision of EU federalism that has, despite dominating political and intellectual debate, never been a short to mid term viable possibility in political organisation for the peoples of Europe. Even deepening moves to turn the EU Rapid Reaction Force, which is a bold step in the right direction with 60,000 strong battle groups nearing readiness; into a reactive solution are non-starters. Institutionally we do not want to mimic NATO’s failings, such as war by committee and or countries being able to politically ‘free-load’ under a security umbrella on an EU wide level. That would still leave us facing the same problems.
Re-thinking our strategic situation requires a tearing up of such orthodoxy. With Russian aircraft entering British airspace and the Kremlin threatening the energy security of the continent in barely coded warnings of a ‘cold-winter’ and a possibly calamitous enxhange in the Middle East between Iran and the United States a possibility, if not a likelihood, the time for a re-think is urgent.
Given the fact that we need to think outside the NATO and EU box and that most European states are unwilling to take their own security seriously, in particular Germany which whose defence spending has now hit 1.2% of GDP, we need to think fast before our forces lag too far behind technologically and in terms of training to make a difference in the future. As it stands only Britain, and to a lesser extent France have armed forces that can co-ordinate serious combat missions with the United States. Considering the intellectual and political path Germany has taken since re-unification in stark contrast to most other European states, a new ‘sonderweg’ is now well underway in favour of dogmatic near-pacifism and isolationism within an EU context, and first moves towards restoring Europe’s security need to take into account that Germany is never going to lead them and is highly-unlikely to throw its full weight behind them in the near and mid-term future. This leaves Britain and France, if they are serious about human and energy security no choice but to present an alternative force and vision to the United States by making a strong united stand.
Going back to the Entente would involve British and French forces training on a far closer level than previously done before, unprecedented technological transfer and joint-projects and a commitment towards making both our armed forces totally inter-operational as soon as possible. London and Paris should commit towards presenting a new shared vision and backing it up by joint increases in military expenditure that could be off-set by the large financial savings incurred by specialisation with an increasingly common and effective defence force. Huge increases in effectiveness could not only be incurred especially in naval forces and in troop transporters, but also across the board. Such moves could play into Gordon Brown and Nicholas Sarkozy’s desires to ‘do something’ in international affairs whilst not stumbling
Considering the none too optimistic nature of the recent UN state of the Environment report, it is essential we re-focus our security concerns and planning towards environmental disaster both at home and across Africa and the Middle East. Founding and equipping a new Anglo-French corps of professional engineers to deal with future meltdowns and specific peacekeeping brigade would be a step in the right direction, both open to participation for European countries serious about defence. Such steps could make serious impact on the European and world scene; it would demonstrate humanitarian action that did not necessitate American backing was possible and drive forward the moves towards European taking on the hard-power it needs to increase its influence world wide. A new entente would require a joint declaration of principles and mission in international affairs that could go a long way towards salvaging both countries reputations for lack of independence of action, Britain’s slurred by being ‘Bush’s poodle’ – France by failing to act significantly at all and Chirac’s poor leadership
A new Entente for action that by-passes EU institutions and NATO would not be about replacing either, but if the project proves a success could slowly re-found European hard-power and eventually be integrated into EU institutions if the current deep pessimism and immobility is breached thanks to popular support. However merely founding new brigades and taskforces to undertake emergency disaster relief, peacekeeping and military action in the near-abroad will not tackle Europe’s energy insecurity. In order to limit Russian influence and prevent member states being black-mailed, especially as recent reports of clan rifts in the Kremlin might lead to an increase in aggressive behaviour perhaps in the Baltic states, the EU needs to take a two-track approach. Britain and France need to spear-head an energy security pact within the EU, acknowledge the political nature of Gazprom and begin a process of market liberalisation and breaking up of monopolies that would allow no country to be totally dependent on one energy source and thus cut off. Smart market reforms are a way of ensuring Gazprom cut off our energy independence.
The perfect storm brewing over Tehran’s nuclear programme is the perfect opportunity for Britain and France to announce a new Entente in clear opposition to the current drift of Washington towards war. Europe is Iran largest trading partner and by proposing to fight Tehran through a pro-active containment policy like that taken towards the Soviet Union, whilst making it clear that that any future attack on Israel or the Gulf states means war, we can help avert America’s own Suez moment. London and Paris must take hard-choices and bold moves to face the storm.
The combination of an unwillingness in most European states to take defence spending seriously, increasing ideological differences with the United States and the pressing issue of its reliability as a friend and ally, the unfeasibility of taking European integration further given political opposition and institutional unwieldiness for the time being in an era of renewed danger is leaving EU citizens at risk and its elites directionless and unsure where to turn.
The immediate security challenges for the EU member states are both radically different and ominously familiar. The rise of a violent mass ideology of Islamic extremism in the near-abroad, with increasing in-roads at home in dissatisfied immigrant Muslim communities, has seen a serious threat of terrorism emerge within the Union. The same force is threatening to transform the political topography of North Africa and the Middle East from a series of cruel and unpopular regimes with friendly relations to Europe, into a sequence of bloody revolutions repeating Khomeini’s ’79 - with potentially catastrophic consequences for the continent. The resurgence of Russia now ruled by an FSB elite, buoyed by the strategic resources of oil and natural gas which have been increasingly used to further the restoration of an exclusive sphere of interest and roll back democratisation is now emerging as a major challenge. In terms of power-projection, Russia may now have more of capacity to influence and actually control western-European governments than at any time since the opening salvoes of the Cold War. Environmental concerns may present massive security challenges very shortly, of which recent mass flooding, forest fires and heat-waves could be mere overtures.
All of these Europe specific challenges are occurring during a dangerous phase of transition from American uni-polarity, which has been incredibly poorly managed by the Bush Administration, towards an age when economically, technologically and demographically multi-polarity is becoming a reality and no longer an abstract inevitability. The United Sates, poised on an edge between aggressive Jacksonian militarism and populist introversion, is fast becoming an un-reliable ally and as recent events in the Middle East suggest - even a liability to the EU. Neither Democratic protectionism and introversion or militaristic ideological Republicanism are consistent with European aims and ideals, both are harmful and will undermine our position if we continue to rely upon Washington. Looking at Asia’s rising powers, China is clearly not a ‘strategic partner’ as its enthusiasm for the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation has shown, and with India, despite the optimism, it is simply too early to say. The delicate and overlapping legal, financial and security realms of American uni-polarity are decomposing and face collapse if the mounting Iranian crisis leads to war. Europe cannot shelter from this storm, hope to ignore or not be affected by it. The challenge is real and the moment is now.
European security has been based around four axiomatic beliefs since 1991. The first is a conviction that American influence is broadly positive and that the US imperium is ‘shared’ with the EU and is furthering Europe’s own ends. Since 2001, needless to say American foreign policy has not been helpful. The second premise is that the democratisation experience in Eastern Europe could be repeated world-wide to encourage EU security, denying any counter-vailing opinions and evidence that suggest it was a historical ‘one-off’ based more on the re-integration of countries that had been militarily and culturally occupied by Soviet Russia. The third conviction was that NATO could evolve into a force to spread democratisation, eventually spread to include most former Soviet states and even the Russian Federation, and conduct ‘out of theatre’ operations in the near-abroad. Despite the extreme difficulty of responding even to the Balkan wars, considering it took genocide and an attempted mass-expulsion to get NATO on the ground and the extreme difficulties of operating in Afghanistan as an alliance commanders and journalists are reporting daily, for some reason this belief had remained axiomatic orthodoxy in the debate. Finally, European policy makers and debate formers have remained convinced that the options on the table are an either/or solution between a ‘European army’ and continuing NATO. The European alternative is none-viable for the short to medium terms as it is part of a vision of EU federalism that has, despite dominating political and intellectual debate, never been a short to mid term viable possibility in political organisation for the peoples of Europe. Even deepening moves to turn the EU Rapid Reaction Force, which is a bold step in the right direction with 60,000 strong battle groups nearing readiness; into a reactive solution are non-starters. Institutionally we do not want to mimic NATO’s failings, such as war by committee and or countries being able to politically ‘free-load’ under a security umbrella on an EU wide level. That would still leave us facing the same problems.
Re-thinking our strategic situation requires a tearing up of such orthodoxy. With Russian aircraft entering British airspace and the Kremlin threatening the energy security of the continent in barely coded warnings of a ‘cold-winter’ and a possibly calamitous enxhange in the Middle East between Iran and the United States a possibility, if not a likelihood, the time for a re-think is urgent.
Given the fact that we need to think outside the NATO and EU box and that most European states are unwilling to take their own security seriously, in particular Germany which whose defence spending has now hit 1.2% of GDP, we need to think fast before our forces lag too far behind technologically and in terms of training to make a difference in the future. As it stands only Britain, and to a lesser extent France have armed forces that can co-ordinate serious combat missions with the United States. Considering the intellectual and political path Germany has taken since re-unification in stark contrast to most other European states, a new ‘sonderweg’ is now well underway in favour of dogmatic near-pacifism and isolationism within an EU context, and first moves towards restoring Europe’s security need to take into account that Germany is never going to lead them and is highly-unlikely to throw its full weight behind them in the near and mid-term future. This leaves Britain and France, if they are serious about human and energy security no choice but to present an alternative force and vision to the United States by making a strong united stand.
Going back to the Entente would involve British and French forces training on a far closer level than previously done before, unprecedented technological transfer and joint-projects and a commitment towards making both our armed forces totally inter-operational as soon as possible. London and Paris should commit towards presenting a new shared vision and backing it up by joint increases in military expenditure that could be off-set by the large financial savings incurred by specialisation with an increasingly common and effective defence force. Huge increases in effectiveness could not only be incurred especially in naval forces and in troop transporters, but also across the board. Such moves could play into Gordon Brown and Nicholas Sarkozy’s desires to ‘do something’ in international affairs whilst not stumbling
Considering the none too optimistic nature of the recent UN state of the Environment report, it is essential we re-focus our security concerns and planning towards environmental disaster both at home and across Africa and the Middle East. Founding and equipping a new Anglo-French corps of professional engineers to deal with future meltdowns and specific peacekeeping brigade would be a step in the right direction, both open to participation for European countries serious about defence. Such steps could make serious impact on the European and world scene; it would demonstrate humanitarian action that did not necessitate American backing was possible and drive forward the moves towards European taking on the hard-power it needs to increase its influence world wide. A new entente would require a joint declaration of principles and mission in international affairs that could go a long way towards salvaging both countries reputations for lack of independence of action, Britain’s slurred by being ‘Bush’s poodle’ – France by failing to act significantly at all and Chirac’s poor leadership
A new Entente for action that by-passes EU institutions and NATO would not be about replacing either, but if the project proves a success could slowly re-found European hard-power and eventually be integrated into EU institutions if the current deep pessimism and immobility is breached thanks to popular support. However merely founding new brigades and taskforces to undertake emergency disaster relief, peacekeeping and military action in the near-abroad will not tackle Europe’s energy insecurity. In order to limit Russian influence and prevent member states being black-mailed, especially as recent reports of clan rifts in the Kremlin might lead to an increase in aggressive behaviour perhaps in the Baltic states, the EU needs to take a two-track approach. Britain and France need to spear-head an energy security pact within the EU, acknowledge the political nature of Gazprom and begin a process of market liberalisation and breaking up of monopolies that would allow no country to be totally dependent on one energy source and thus cut off. Smart market reforms are a way of ensuring Gazprom cut off our energy independence.
The perfect storm brewing over Tehran’s nuclear programme is the perfect opportunity for Britain and France to announce a new Entente in clear opposition to the current drift of Washington towards war. Europe is Iran largest trading partner and by proposing to fight Tehran through a pro-active containment policy like that taken towards the Soviet Union, whilst making it clear that that any future attack on Israel or the Gulf states means war, we can help avert America’s own Suez moment. London and Paris must take hard-choices and bold moves to face the storm.
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