Ambition and Uncertainty: France's New Security Policy

Sarkozy's ambitions for the French military begin to take shape in an atmosphere of public uncertainty and unease.

By Ben Judah in Paris for ISN Security Watch (09/07/08)

French President Nicolas Sarkozy launched his latest campaign designed to force a rupture with the past on 17 June. In the first rethink of France's strategic aims in 14 years, the "White Book on Defense and Homeland Security" prioritizes intelligence gathering and network warfare designed to turn the French military into a 21st century fighting force.

These gains are intended to be paid for by steep cuts in the number of staff and bases across the country.

The plan also calls for the re-integration of France into NATO's military command structure, in exchange for a possible trade off of increased common European defense policies.

Such bold moves are causing a stir in Paris, while senior military commanders have come out angrily against troop cuts.

Bold moves forward

"We are abandoning European military leadership to the British, when we know their particular relationship with the United States," wrote the group of senior officers calling itself Surcouf - the name of a legendary French corsair who captured dozens of British ships in the Napoleonic wars - in an open and anonymous letter to France's right-wing daily Le Figaro.

The cutting of 54,000 military and civilian defense jobs, the closing of regiments, the postponement of a second aircraft carrier and the shutting down of bases across France to pay for high-technology and military reform has been anything but welcomed in the French leadership.

Labeling Sarkozy's plan "amateurish," Surcouf has argued that while the UK has understood that more troops are necessary to hold the frontlines where they are engaged, the decision to cut troops and harm morale at a time when the French military is engaged on many fronts is a desperate mistake.

The results of the stand-off between the military and the presidency has left the French in a state of confusion.

On 3 July, Le Monde added to the confusion by stating in an editorial that "nobody knows where such conflicts could lead." What had caused France's renowned newspaper to take such a sensationalist (albeit ambiguous) point of view was the dismissal of French Military Chief Bruno Cuche after an incident in which members of the public where harmed during a military parade due to military negligence. It was a move widely believed to be the presidency's attempt to restore order to the military.

Most Parisians are sanguine about the issue. The views of Gilles Cahoreau, a scriptwriter from the 8e arrondisment, sums up those of a large proportion of the French.

"It's impossible to know if this instance if we are seeing the mobilizing of networks and interest groups trying to defend narrow economic concerns or if they are truly acting to defend the national interest. I doubt they are aware there is a difference between the two however," he wrote.

Céline Forgues, 21, a student at the University Science-Po Paris, suggested that younger and more left-leaning people were more concerned.

"This is all about Sarkozy trying to break other poles of influence. He's drained all power from his ministers and now he's trying to do the same thing with the army," she told ISN Security Watch.

Atlantic ideas

Jean-Dominique Merchet, senior defense correspondent at Liberation and French strategy blogger, dismisses these public concerns.

"There is simply no strategic debate with these people. It's all about jobs. They are simply unwilling to let these vast amounts of money and troops go. They want new technology and no change to the existing system. And at the end of the day - generals must respect the president's wishes," he told ISN Security Watch.

"The old plans were still outlined for a Russian invasion of France and dated from the Cold War. This is ridiculous, especially at a time when wars are getting harder. The little affair in Chad - that ended with tanks, anti-aircraft attacks and helicopters. We need new equipment to deal with the increasing violence in such missions. There is very little alternative. […]"

Daniel Keohane, an Irish research fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, argues that we should interpret the new strategy in many ways an adoption of Atlantic thinking.

"If I was British I'd be highly flattered by the latest French plans in the 'White Book,'" he told ISN Security Watch.

"The French haven't had a proper defense review since before the Kosovo war and the thinking contained in the proposals show that they have understood that the world has changed."

Interestingly, Keohane points out that the French had two options: either the German military option of a large but relatively unsophisticated standing army; or the UK/US option.

"We can see they have opted for this [latter] approach based on the focus on "network warfare" - making sure things can coordinate and speak to one and other on the battlefield."

Keohane points out that French procurement strategies are to be re-focused onto satellites, intelligence gathering, flexible transportation and first-class communications. In many ways, France is implementing the "Revolution in Military Affairs" which saw UK and US forces move toward a reliance on high-technology in the run-up to the Iraq and Afghan wars, with the added benefit of the experience those conflicts have brought to military planners.

Keohane believes that "the proposals outlined in the White Book are broadly good, taking into account what has been the accepted wisdom of top-class European military planners for the past five years."

However, he cautions, the issue is largely mathematical.

"Reforms save you money in the long term, but they cost you a lot in the short term. It remains to be seen if the French have done the right calculations in a field that is notoriously hard to estimate. The second uphill struggle they will face is one of institutional dialogue; of actually making the various distinct and competitive organizations you have today in the security domain communicate with each other and act effectively."

Sarkozy has bold plans for his new 21st century fighting force. He intends that instead of fighting slightly outside of NATO's command structure, following the ambiguous Gaullist maxim toward the US of "friend, allied, non-aligned," France will play a leading role and the heart of the western alliance.

Renaud Girard, a senior foreign correspondent and Professor of Strategic Affairs at Science-Po believes that "Sarkozy sees a family of nations in existence. The family of democracy, of France, the UK and the US."

Girard said Sarkozy also believes in a "world where you are instantly accountable for your own mistakes, by the media or terrorists alike, in a world where you are responsible too for the mistakes of your friends."

As such, Girard said, there is no place for Gaullist dogma and "it makes no sense to keep the vulgate of Chirac's policy going - that belongs to the era of great power blocs. No NATO standing forces exist as they did in the Cold War. France has participated in every major NATO mission and is leading some of them. It's a deeply symbolic, pragmatic and mostly cosmetic move."

French gains and losses

The question of whether Sarkozy has secured a good deal for France is causing the French great concern as the new strategy unfolds.

Professor Anatol Lieven of Kings College London, author and expert on Euro-American relations, sees the deal as highly beneficial to France.

"The new NATO structures do come with one enormous condition, which is that Russia does not once again become an enemy. If NATO has to plan for the possibility of a war in Ukraine or Georgia, then France's new forces make no sense at all," Lieven told ISN Security Watch.

"From that point of view, the French approach of selective cooperation with the US, supporting the mission in Afghanistan but opposing US calls for NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, does seem logical."

However, there is a self-limiting nature to Sarkozy's possible gains in strategic affairs.

The president's personality (something that has proved beneficial in certain cases of advancing French interests) may prove a liability during the French presidency of the EU.

The concept behind the trade off of rejoining the NATO command structure has been sold in Paris as resulting in a greater drive toward a common European defense and security policy. Shorn of any concepts that France might be acting as a rival to the US, by removing its ambiguous position symbolically through NATO and establishing excellent relations with the superpower, the French expected to achieve gains on European defense during their Presidency.

However, given the institutional and political malaise the EU is facing following the Irish "no" vote - which ruined Sarkozy's big idea of the Lisbon "mini-treaty" to replace the rejected Constitutional Treaty - there simply isn't enough political capital to make moves toward European defense in the near-future.

The UK foreign secretary came out on 2 July in favor of supporting French aims for a common security and defense policy, but given the weakness of Prime Minister Gordon Brown's government, such support will not be the rock-solid political will Sarkozy will need.

Keohane, for his part, expects a more incremental, but none the less significant approach to be taken.

"We can expect steps to be taken toward a joint-procurement list, joint-exercises and more joint training. What Sarkozy wants from the EU is a General HQ and a system to be put in place and a road-map to be put in place for the future. But we are only at a very early stage of the French presidency," he said.

Marc Semo, foreign editor of the French center-left French daily Liberation, views the main failing of French foreign and security policy being one of discourse.

"The problem is that nobody knows what France wants. You have Sarkozy's discourse for the Germans, for the Israelis, for the Russians, for the British and the Americans, but no overall sense of where the country is going. It's lurching forward by its own dynamic," he told ISN Security Watch.

"However, the paradox of France's current position is that given the excellent relations that Sarkozy's foreign policy adviser, Jean-David Levitte, has in the US and the recent strategic moves back toward an Atlantic posture, we are in a position to be the most pro-American country in Europe - one that could be extremely beneficial to France if Barack Obama wins, which is something Levitte has been anticipating for over a year."

With ambition and uncertainty, France is rebuilding its military capacity from a Gaullist Cold War posture to that of a high-tech, networked force playing a leading role within the Atlantic Alliance. The question remains whether or not Sarkozy will be able to actualize his promises and capitalize on his positions.